St. John's Law Review
Volume 46
Number 4 Volume 46, May 1972, Number 4

Article 39

Summary Proceeding: Purpose of Summary Proceeding
Frustrated by Litigious Party
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:768

pality, having suffered the economic hardships resulting from both a
public employee strike and mandatory litigation expenses, would see
any contempt penalties ultimately imposed paid to the state.
2 67
Precisely this situation arose in Goodman v.State of New York.
Plaintiff Goodman, as Clerk of the Supreme Court in New York
County, became the holder of contempt fines resulting from proceedings instituted by the city against certain public employee unions.
Both the city and state claimed the funds, the former because they
resulted from litigation which the city was required to initiate,268 the
latter because the funds were punitive and not compensatory in nature.
The court acknowledged that while the city was clearly the aggrieved
party, the proceedings under which the fines were imposed were criminal and therefore the fines were not considered compensatory. But the
court viewed the city as acting in a dual capacity, not only as the aggrieved party but also as the party statutorily compelled to institute the
proceedings:
In this posture, with the local governmental body ... mandated to the expenses of litigation and protection of the rights of
its constituent public, it lies implicit in the statute [Judiciary Law
§ 751(2)] that fines collected thereunder belong to that
govern26 9
mental body responsible for enforcement of the statute.
Though subject to criticism, the Taylor Law was at least designed
to allow governmental operation to proceed unimpeded by public employee strikes or threats of strike. When those operations are impeded,
the parties who primarily suffer are the governmental body against
which the strike is called and its constituents. Under the facts in Goodman, it would clearly be inequitable to allow the state, which has suffered minimally in comparison to the city, to recover the penalties.
SUMMARY PROCEEDING

Summary proceeding: Purpose of summary proceeding frustrated by
litigious party.
The fundamental purpose of summary judgment is to avoid the
necessity of a trial.27 0 In the landlord-tenant area, the proceeding by
which such judgment is obtained was "designed to provide the land207 67 Misc. 2d 877, 325 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
268 See note 266 supra.
269 67 Misc. 2d at 878, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
270 Smyser, The Summary Judgment- Ascertainment of the Genuine Issue, 16 S.D.L.
REv. 20 (1971).
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lord with a simple, expeditious and inexpensive means of regaining
possession of his premises for non-payment of rent.127 1

Two such summary proceedings for non-payment and one holdover summary proceeding were involved in Hotel Martha Washington
Management Co. v. Swinick.272 The defendant-tenant did not file an

answer in any of these actions, but rather moved in a federal district
court to divest the state court of its jurisdiction, alleging that she would
be denied her constitutional rights in the civil court. In each instance
the landlord filed a petition in the district court to secure an order
remanding the proceedings to the civil court. Ultimately, the landlord's
motions were granted.
On the day of trial, the tenant "made a demand for the appointment of counsel, leave to file a jury demand and for the issuance of
subpoenas."2 73 In the two non-payment proceedings the court denied
this request on the ground that the tenant had demonstrated that she
274
was cognizant of the risks involved in not answering the complaints.
The court declared that
[t]his is not a case where the failure to interpose an answer was the
result of mistake, oversight or other inadvertent failure. On the
contrary, it was with the knowledge that her time to file an answer
was limited .... 275
It therefore concluded that "she should bear the consequences of [her]
course of action ..

"276

In the holdover proceeding, which was "based on the claim that
the tenant's term had expired and on the further claim that her con,"277 the court denied the tenant's appliduct [was] objectionable.
cation for counsel, jury and subpoenas only in relation to her affirmative defenses and counterclaims, which the court deemed unassertable.
The fact that the tenant failed to file an answer did not, however, shift
271 Emray Realty Corp. v. Jackson, 12 Misc. 2d 62, 174 N.YS.2d 618 (App. T. 1st
Dep't 1958).
272 67 Misc. 2d 390, 324 N.Y.S.2d 687 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
273 Id. at 394, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
274 In the tenant's second petition to the federal court to divest the state court of
jurisdiction, she stated:
I am due in Civil Court of the County of New York... pursuant to the notice
of petition and petition in that I must put in an answer within five (5) days after
service upon me.

Id.
275 Id. at 395, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
276 Id. at 396, 324 N.YS.2d at 694; see Gooden v. Galashaw, 42 Misc. 2d 8, 247 N.Y.S.2d
186 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1964).
277 67 Misc. 2d at 398, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
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the burden of proof from the landlord in establishing the truth of his
claims. With respect to these issues the tenant was permitted a jury
trial and the issuance of subpoenas. The court further observed that
the legal aid society would represent the plaintiff if she were found
eligible.

278

As previously indicated, the primary purpose of a summary judgment is to save the time and expense ordinarily entailed in a trial. Its
speed is its justification. Any attempt by a litigant to thwart this purpose should be seriously considered. The tenant in the case under consideration has continually frustrated attempts to obtain summary judgments. These tactics have consumed a substantial amount of judicial
time and energy and have subjected the courts and judges to much
abuse. Since 1968 the tenant has instituted twenty-two actions naming
as defendants "the Sheriff of New York City, the District Attorney of
New York County, a judge of the Criminal Court, the Police Department, the Department of Social Welfare and the Criminal Court." 279
20
The tenant claimed as justification that "she want[ed] security."
The court recommended that an action be brought in the supreme
court to ascertain whether the tenant should be punished for contempt
and enjoined from bringing any action in the criminal court, civil
court, or supreme court without authorization. No such action has yet
been brought.
278 At the outset, the court noted that the tenant was relying upon Hotel Martha
Washington Management Co. v. Swinick, 66 Misc. Rd 883, 322 N.Y.S.2d 189 (App. T. Ist
Dep't 1971), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 355, 868 (1971). The
appellate term therein reversed the civil court and allowed the tenant "'to defend . . .
as a poor person, without liability for the payment of jury fees and with leave to apply
to the Court below for issuance of subpoenas and the appointment of counsel."' 67 Misc.
2d at 391, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 689, quoting Hotel Martha Washington Management Co. v.
Swinick, 66 Misc. 2d 833, 322 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1971).
279 67 Misc. 2d at 406, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
280 Id. at 410, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 707.

